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THE EXTENSION OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS
TO NON-RESIDENT BUSINESS MEN
Until recently it had been well settled that a state could not im-
pute to a non-resident individual consent to personal jurisdiction
merely from the circumstance of his doing business within its borders.
It is thought that the courts which sustained this proposition were
guided by two fundamental considerations. In the first place, they felt
that to adopt a contrary position would violate the general rule that a
personal judgment against a non-resident individual who was not
served within that state, or who did not appear or consent to construc-
tive service is void.1 Secondly, the decision in Flexner v. Farson2 was
interpreted as committing the Supreme Court of the United States to
the view that the states lacked the power to extend their processes to
non-resident business men on the basis of an implied consent to a stat-
ute prescribing substituted service. Upon analysis, however, there no
longer seems to be a sound reason for the position that doing business
in the state is not a sufficient basis for the imputation of consent to per-
sonal jurisdiction.
3
1Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) is the foundation case.
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 S. Ct. 343, 61 L. ed. 6o8 (1917); Arndt v. Griggs,
134 U. S. 316, 10 S. Ct. 557, 33 L. ed. 918 (189o); Brooks v. Dun, 51 Fed. 138 (C. C.
W. D. Tenn. 1892) . Prior to the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, federal and state courts
alike refused to recognize a judgment from the court of another state rendered
against a non-resident of that state without personal service therein, a general ap-
pearance by the non-resident, or consent to the jurisdiction of the court. A majority
of the states, however, refused to question the validity of the judgment when the
matter of process had been passed upon and sustained in the state in which it was
rendered. Galpin v. Page, x8 Wall. 350, 21 L. ed. 959 (U. S. 1873) ; McCauley v. Ful-
ton, 44 Cal. 355 (1872); Kendrick v. Kimball, 33 N. H. 485 (1856); Davidson v.
Sharpe, 28 N. C. (6 Ired. L.) 14 (1845) ; Butterworth v. Kinsey, 14 Tex. 5oo (1855).
A minority of the states followed a contrary view. They reasoned that the lack of
jurisdiction over the person which authorized the courts of another state to refuse to
recognize the judgment invalidated it even in the state where rendered. Backman v.
Hopkins, 11 Ark. 157 (1850); Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321 (1863); Dearing v. Bank of
Charlestown, 5 Ga. 479 (1848). This view was adopted by Pennoyer v. Neff, which
case is regarded as settling the doctrine that was thereafter followed by the majority
of the states. However, even after this decision a few courts continued to pay lip
service to the former majority view. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Rad-
cliffe, 137 U. S. 287, ii S. Ct. 92, 34 L. ed. 670 (189o) ; Hart v. Sanson, i o U. S. 151,
3 S. Ct. 586, 28 L. ed. 1O1 (1884); Dupont v. Abel, 81 Fed. 534 (C. C. D. S. C. 1897);
Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md. 53o (1883). See Note (190) 50 L. R. A. 577.
2248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919).
3Only incidental references will be made to the bases for jurisdiction over non-
resident corporations.
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The decision of Pennoyer v. Neff4 definitely established the prin-
ciple that in a purely personal action for the recovery of money dam-
ages jurisdiction could not be obtained over a non-resident defendant
through constructive service by publication. The court which decided
that case, however, stated:
"Neither do we mean to assert that a State could not require
a non-resident entering into a partnership or association within
its limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an
agent or representative in the State to receive service of process
and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such
partnership, association, or contracts, or to designate a place
where such service may be made and notice given, and provide,
upon their failure, to make such appointment or to designate
such place that service may be made upon a public officer des-
ignated for that purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and
that judgments rendered upon such service may not be binding
upon the non-residents both within and without the State." 5
The validity of substituted service of process on a non-resident business
man was not questioned by the Supreme Court6 until the case of Flexner
v. Farson7 which was decided in 1919. The statute8 under which that
cause arose provided that in actions brought against non-resident indi-
viduals, or partnerships and other unincorporated associations the
members of which resided in other states, engaged in business in Ken-
tucky, summons might be served on the agent in charge of such busi-
ness. In an action against a non-resident partnership which was doing
business in Kentucky, service of process was made in accordance with
this statute. The judgment which the plaintiff recovered in Kentucky
was sued upon in Illinois.9 The Illinois court dismissed the action for
'95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877). See comment supra note i.
595 U. S. 714, 735 (1877) . To this effect see, Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18
How. 404 (U. S. 1855); Gillespie v. Commercial Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 12
Gray 201 (Mass. 1858). In an early English case it was said that ". . . it is not con-
trary to natural justice that a man who has agreed to receive a particular mode of
notification of legal proceedings should be bound by a judgment in which that par-
ticular mode of notification has been followed, even though he may not have had
actual notice of them." Vallee v. Dumerque, 4 Exch. 290, 303, 154 Eng. Rep. 1221,
1227 (1849).
6In Brooks v. Dun, 51 Fed. 138 (C. C. W. Tenn. 1892) it was held that sub-
stituted service of process upon the agent of a non-resident partnership was in-
effective as denying due process of law. Compare Smith v. Farbenfabriken of Elber-
feld Co., 203 Fed. 476 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913) in which such service was upheld as
against a resident of Canada.
'248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919), hereinafter referred to as the
Flexner Case.
"Ky. Civil Code (Carroll, 19o6) § 51 (6).
'268 I1. 43.5. 1o9 N. E. 327 (1915).
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want of personal jurisdiction by Kentucky. This position was sustained
by the Supreme Court 10 which declared that Kentucky was without
power to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in
such a manner."
It has been argued that the principle of the Flexner case is funda-
mentally weak. 12 The statute under which that cause arose was dis-
criminatory in that it applied only to non-residents and ". . . did not
restrict the actions in which process might be served to those arising
out of transactions within the state . ...13 Had the position of the
Court been sustained on a due process objection, or on the basis of a
denial of equal protection of the laws, it is thought that subsequent
efforts of the states to extend their processes under statutes which did
not deny to the non-resident individuals these constitutional guar-
antees might have been upheld. The Flexner decision proceeded, how-
ever, upon the theory that a state could prevent a foreign corporation
from doing business within its borders 4 and so might require as a con-
dition of admission the appointment of an agent upon whom process
might be served; 15 but that it could not prevent a private individual
10248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919).
uThis statute had been sustained in Crane v. Hall, 165 Ky. 827, 178 S. W. lO96
(1915) ; Guenther v. American Steel Hoop Co., 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419 (1903). Cf.
Rauber v. Whitney, 125 Ind. 216, 25 N. E. 186 (18go); Cook v. Darling, 18 Pick. 393
(Mass. 1836); Graves v. Cushman, 131 Mass. 359 (1881); Kendrick v. Kimball, 33 N. H.
485 (1856). Similar statutes had been held unconstiutional in Brooks v. Dun, 51 Fed.
138 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1892); Aikman v. Sanderson & Porter, 122 La. 265, 47 So.
6oo (19o8); Cabanne v. Graff, 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461 (1902), 59 L. R. A. 735
(1903).
2Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State
(1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 909; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business
Within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
'1 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State
(1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 909, 918.
"4Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. 274 (U. S. 1839); Paul v. Vir-
ginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (U. S. 1868).
'1Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 (U. S. 1855);
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37
S. Ct. 344, 61 L. ed. 6io (1917); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1915). It is of interest to note the development of the
rules as to jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Formerly it was held that a cor-
poration could not migrate, and so the processes of another state could not reach it
even though it could make contracts and transact business beyond its borders. Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 1o L. ed. 274 (U. S. 1839) . Because of the intolerable
conditions thus created, several legal "fictions" were adopted by means of which the
corporations were made amenable to the processes of the states in which they did
business. Professor Scott suggests three possible bases for the acquisition of jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations. (i) The theory of implied consent, first announced in
Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. .151 (U. S. 1855). Since the
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from doing business there,'6 and so could not impose as a condition for
his admission his assent to substituted service of process. Thus it was
concluded that Kentucky had no power to impose restrictions upon the
admission of the out-of-state partnership. This theory of exclusion,
however, will appear defective when it is remembered that even though
a state may not exclude a corporation engaged in federal employ17 or
in interstate commerce,' 8 it may still subject it to reasonable regula-
tions.19
Although the position of the Court may be sustained on the basis
of the analogy which it chose, the decision seems an unfortunate one. It
did not consider the question of the reasonableness of the substituted
service or the problem of the denial of equal protection of the laws.
Only incidental reference was made to the privileges and immunities of
citizens. For this reason, the case should not be conclusive against a
state's power to subject non-resident individuals to the jurisdiction of
its courts by means of substituted service when process is sought to be
extended upon the theory of a reasonable regulation of business.
20
state had power to exclude foreign corporations from doing business it had the
power to prescribe the terms upon which business could be done. By doing business
under such conditions the corporation impliedly consented to be bound by service
upon its representatives in that state. (2) The theory of corporate presence within
the state. Under this concept a corporation is present and may be served within any
state in which it does business. This theory does away with the fiction of implied
consent. Its weakness lies in the fact that the courts have never completely aban-
doned the dictum in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 5i9, io L. ed. 274 (U. S. 1839)
to the effect that a corporation can have no legal existence outside the state which
created it. (3) The theory of the state's power to subject corporations to reasonable
regulations. When a corporation voluntarily does business within a state it is bound
by reasonable regulations of that state. Thus it may be said that jurisdiction is based
upon the control of the state which results from the voluntary act of doing business
within the state. Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State
(1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
1 'Corfield v. Coryell, ,t Wash. C. C. 37!, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1823).
'7See Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U. S. 181, 8 S. Ct. 737, 3 L. ed. 6,o (1888).
"Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 57, 11 S. Ct. 851, 35 L. ed. 649 (1891);
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 S. Ct. so6, 66 L. ed. 239
(1921); International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 S. Ct. 481, 54 L. ed. 678,
27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 493 (1910); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 S. Ct. 57,
59 L. ed. 193 (1914); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct.
190, 54 L_ ed. 355 (1910 ) •
'0International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct 944, 58 L. ed.
1197 (1914); Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 92, Comment b.
'OCulp, Process in Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within A State
(1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 909. 917-920.
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In Hess v. Pawloski2l the Supreme Court made a perceptible de-
parture from its principles of jurisdiction when it announced that a
state's power extended to reach non-resident motorists who used its
highways. However, dicta to the effect that "the mere transaction of
business in a state by nonresident natural persons does not imply con-
sent to be bound by the process of its courts" 22 showed that it was not
yet willing to delimit the Flexner decision. The case arose under a
Massachusetts statute23 which provided that the use of Massachusetts
highways by a non-resident motorist was equivalent to the appoint-
ment by him of a Massachusetts officer as statutory agent to receive all
processes in all actions against -him, arising out of accidents or collis-
ions on such highways. This act was upheld as a valid exercise of the
state's police power. The Court reasoned that inasmuch as Massa-
chusetts might exclude non-residents from the use of its highways, it
could impute to them consent to substituted service upon a statutory
agent.2
4
Following the Hess case, the numerous decisions which upheld sim-
ilar statutes, 25 and the decisions of the state courts which sustained
similar service upon non-resident brokers, 26 foretold of a more definite
='274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 7 L. ed. 1o93 (1927), hereinafter referred to as the
Hess Case.
2274 U. S. 352, 355, 47 S. Ct. 632, 633, 71 L. ed. 1o91 (1927).
nMass. General Laws, ch. 9o, as amended by Stat. 1923, ch. 431, § 2.
1"The state's power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by
nonresidents as well as by residents .... And, in advance of the operation of a
motor vehicle on its highways by a nonresident, the state may require him to appoint
one of its officials as his agent on whom process may be served in proceedings grow-
ing out of such use. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o, 37 S. Ct. 3o, 61 L. ed. 222. That
case recognizes power of the state to exclude a nonresident until the formal appoint-
ment is made. And, having the power so to exclude, the state may declare that the
use of the highway by the nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of the
registrar as agent on whom process may be served." 274 U. S. 352, 356, 47 S. Ct. 632,
633, 7 L. ed. io91 (1927).
2Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230
(1928); Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L. ed. 1158 (1933), 88 A. L. R.
170 (1934). See: McBaine, Service Upon a Non-Resident by Service Upon His Agent
(1935) 23 Calif. L. Rev. 482, 484. "The judicial opinions and commentators are
probably not in accord as to the basis for these holdings. Implied consent to service;
the police power of the state; and the right of the state to forbid the doing of speci-
fied acts within its borders unless the non-resident consents to the authority of the
courts of that state, and hence the power of the state validly to provide that the
doing of certain acts by a non-resident within the state shall subject him to the juris-
diction of the courts as to causes of action arising out of such acts, have been sug-
gested as sound reasons for these decisions." Cases collected in Notes (1925) 35 A. L. R.
951, (1928) 57 A. L. R. 1239, (1935) 99 A. L. R. 130.
nRiley v. Sweat, i o Fla. 362, 149 So. 48 (1933) ; Davidson v. Doherty & Co. 214
Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (3932), 91 A. L. R. 1308 (1934); Stoner v. Higginson. 316 Pa.
19401
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break from the earlier Supreme Court view as expressed in the Flexner
case. Thus in Davidson v. Doherty & Co.2 7 the Iowa court upheld an
Iowa statute28 which provided that when any corporation, company, or
individual had for the transaction of any business an office or agency in
any county other than that in which the principal resides, service could
be made on any agent or clerk employed there for all causes of action
arising from the business transacted by that office. Service of process in
compliance with this statute was made on the Iowa agent of a non-
resident broker for a cause of action arising out of a stock transaction
consummated in Iowa. The defendant appeared specially and chal-
lenged the jurisdiction over his person. The court decided that the
service was valid and that it had jurisdiction to render a personal judg-
ment against him. It was argued that although Iowa could not arbi-
trarily exclude the citizens of another state from doing business there, it
was not prohibited by the constitution from imposing reasonable con-
ditions upon non-residents who sought to do business within its bor-
ders29 especially when similar conditions were imposed upon its own
citizens.30 Pennoyer v. Nef]3 ' was distinguished on the ground that the
service in that case had been made by publication, while here there was
substituted service impliedly consented to when the defendant came
into the state to do business. The Flexner case was explained away by
saying that there the person served had ceased to be the defendants'
agent at the time the service was made.32 Moreover, the statute under
which that cause arose was discriminatory in that it applied only to
non-residents, and unreasonable in that it was not limited to causes of
action arising out of the conduct of the defendants' Kentucky business.
481, 175 AtI. 527 (1934). Cf. Thornburg v. Bennett, 206 Iowa 1187, 221 N. W. 840
(1928) ; Dragon Motor Car Co. v. Storrow, 165 Minn. 95, 205 N. W. 694 (1925).
-214 Iowa 739, 241 N. V. 700 (1932), 91 A. L. R. 13o8 (1934).28owa Code (1927) § 11,079.
-Compare: "When residents of other states seek to do business in this state,
either as individuals or as partners, the state has no power arbitrarily to exclude
them. To do so would violate the provision of the federal Constitution which gives
to the citizens of each state all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the sev-
eral states. But this state may impose reasonable conditions upon the exercise of a
nonresident's right to do business within its boundaries." Dicta in Dragon Motor
Car Co. v. Storrow, 165 Minn. 95, 205 N. IV. 694, 695 (1925).
3QThe court interpreted the statute to extend to residents and non-residents alike,
thus precluding any "eqtul-protection" objection.
3'95 U. S. 714, 2.t L. ed. 565 (1877).
raIn the original Illinois suit the defendants pleaded that they had not been
served, that the person upon whom service was made was not their agent, that the
Kentucky statute was unconstitutional, and that the Kentucky court had no jurisdic-
tion. Plaintiff demurred and stood on his demurrer when it was overruled.
[Vol. II
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This attempted distinction of the Flexner case on the basis of non-
agency would appear to be an undesirable one. Mr. Justice Holmes
stated in the Flcxner opinion that the result would have been the
same regardless of whether or not the person upon whom the service
was made was an agent of the defendants. 33 Nevertheless, the decision
reached by the Iowa court seems proper; it recognizes that the basis for
the acquisition of the in personam jurisdiction is the power of the
state to impose reasonable regulations upon non-resident business men
for the protection of its own residents. The court was careful to point
out, however, that such service would be upheld only when there had
been sufficient notice to the defendants to preclude a denial of due
procss of law.
3 4
This Iowa statute35 was again attacked in the case of Doherty & Co.
v. Goodman, 3  in the Supreme Court of the United States. Following
the reasoning of the earlier Iowa case, the Court upheld its validity
and the service thereunder. The opinion was confined to the particular
circumstances and no effort was made to extend its operation. Justifi-
cation for the decision was found from the fact that Iowa treats the
business of selling securities as exceptional and subjects it to special
regulation. By its decision the Court felt that it had gone no further
than the principles approved in the earlier automobile cases.
3 7
Thus it would seem that the Supreme Court was willing to make
exceptions to the doctrine of the Flexner case only when they could be
justified by a reasonable exercise of the state's police power over its
highways,38 or by state control over an exceptional business.39 How-
*248 U. S. 289, 293, 39 S. Ct. 97, 98, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919).
uThe Court adopted the dicta of Thornburg v. Bennett, 2o6 Iowa, 187, 221 N. W.
84o, 842 (x928) to the effect that in order for the service to be upheld as valid "the
defendant must: (i) Have an office or agency in the county. (2) A county other than
that in which he resides. (3) The action must grow out of or be connected with the
business of that office or agency. (4) The agent or clerk upon whom service is made
must be employed in such office or agency."
-'lowa Code (1927) § 11,079.
3294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935)-
3"So far as it affects appellant [defendant], the questioned statute goes no fur-
ther than the principle approved by those opinions [Hess v. Pawloski, Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, Young v. Masci, supra note 24] permits." 294 U. S. 623, 628, 55 S. Ct. 553,
554, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935)-
-"Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. 1o91 (1927); Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o, 37 S. Ct. 3o, 61 L. ed. 222 (1916); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276
U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230 (1928) ; Young v. Masci, 289
U. S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L. ed. ,158 (1933), 88 A. L. R. 170 (1934).
'Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935).
Later cases arising in the state courts: Kaiser v. Butchart, 197 Minn. 28, 265 N. W.
1940]
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ever, the departure from this doctrine which was begun in the Hess case
would seem to have been made complete by a federal district court in
the recent case of Doggett v. Peek.40 That case would impute consent
to substituted service of process whenever the non-resident defendant
established a business within the state.
The Peek case arose under a Texas statute4' which was similiar in
all material respects to the Iowa statute42 involved in Davidson v.
Doherty & Co. 43 and Doherty - Co. v. Goodman.44 It was not an act
which provided for service on non-resident motorists. The defendant
partners, residents of Illinois, had a business agency in Texas. The
plaintiff's parents were killed in an automobile wreck, while riding in a
car driven by the defendants' agent at a time when " '... he was carry-
ing out a mission for the . . .partnership.' 45 In the suit against the
defendants to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff's parents,
process was served on an agent of the defendants pursuant to the terms
of the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that
there had been no proper service of process and that the court was
without jurisdiction over them. The court overruled the motion on the
grounds that it was bound by the decision of Doherty & Co. v. Good-
man46 and that the principles of the Flexner case were inapplicable.
47
826 (1936) (Stock Broker) ; Long v. Sakleson, 328 Pa. 261, 195 At. 416 (1937) (Recip-
rocal Insurance Exchange).
4032 F. Supp. 889 (N. D. Tex. 1940), hereinafter referred to as the Peek Case.
"Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) Art. 2o33b, as amended, Texas Civ. Stat. Ann.
(Vernon, 1935) Art. 20 3 3b, provided that when an individual, partnership, or un-
incorporated association had for the transaction of business, an office or agency in
any county other than that in which the principal resides, service of process to bind
the principal could be made on any agent or clerk there employed in all suits grow-
ing out of the conduct of that business and brought in the county where the place of
business was located; "... and the provisions hereof shall apply as well to non-
residents of the state as to non-residents of such county .. "
42Iowa Code (1927) § 11,079 (supra note 34) did not provide that it was to apply
equally to residents and non-residents. The Iowa court in Davidson v. Doherty & Co.,
214 Iowa 739. 2,t1 N. W. 70o (1932). 91 A. L. R. 13o8 (1934), and the Supreme
Court in Doherty F, Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935)
interpreted that it did so apply.
"'2 t Iow a 739. 2.11 N. W. 700 (1932). 91 A. L. R. 1308 (1934) .
4'294 U1. S. 623. 55 S. Ct. 553.79 L. ed. 097 (935) •
" 32 F. Su)p. 889 (N. I). Tex. 1940).
"294 U. S. 623. 55 S. Ct. 553. 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935).
'The court in the Peek Case used language which could be interpreted as limit-
ing the substituted service of process to causes of actions arising out of accidents and
collisions which occurred oi1 Texas highways. "In addition to the general doctrine
just cited, the Texas statute quoted above [set out supra note 40] is in line with the
approved power of the states over their highways and the use thereof by non-resi-
dents." 32 F. Supp. 889. 89o (N. D. Tex. iqio). It should be noticed, however, that
[Vol. II
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It was pointed out that since the service had been made upon the agent,
it could be assumed that he had given notice to his principal.
Since it was declared that Doherty & Co. v. Goodman48 went no fur-
ther than the principles approved by the Hess case, and this latter case
specifically declared that consent to substituted service of process could
not be implied from the mere transaction of business within the juris-
diction by a non-resident individual,49 it is necessary to investigate the
real ba sis of the Peek decision in order to determine how far the federal
courts may extend their "Hess concept" of personal jurisdiction.
Of course the ultimate aim of the statutes which authorize the states
to extend their power so as to reach certain classes of non-residents is
to enable the citizens of that state to have their claims against such
non-residents prosecuted locally. The basis for this extension would
seem to be the protection of local interests. Whether or not that pro-
tection will be afforded depends upon: First, whether the public inter-
est of the forum is sufficient to warrant the extension of substituted
service of process to any particular class of non-residents. Second,
whether constitutional barriers will prevent such an extension.
Applying this analysis to the Peek case, the question first to be de-
termined is whether it is of sufficient public interest to the citizens of
Texas that they be enabled to proceed against any non-resident who
does business in Texas by service of process upon his Texas agent.
Most of the authorities will agree that the public interest of Texas,
warrants such service.50 At least one writer has considered that the
expense and inconvenience imposed on a prospective plaintiff by a
contrary position which would make it necessary to bring suit in a dis-
tant jurisdiction, and the fact that such a rule would often lead to a
denial of any relief at all, are factors furnishing a sufficient basis upon
which to predicate an extension of the state's power.51 The result of the
this was not necessary to the decision and it should not be implied that the plaintiff
r(elied upon this statute to effect service of process of the "'Hess v. Pawloski" type. Had
this been her purpose, service would have been made under Texas Rev. Civ. Stat.
(1929) Art. ao3ga which provides for service of process on non-resident motorists,
their agents, servants, or employees.
"294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935).
'274 U. S. 352, 355, 47 S. Ct. 632, 633, 71 L. ed. io91 (1927), supra note 21.
5Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State
(1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. gog; Hinton, Substituted Service on Non-Residents (1925) 20
ll. L. Rev. i; McBaine, Service Upon a Non-Resident by Service Upon His Agent
(1935) 23 Calif. L. Rev. 482; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business
Within a State (igig) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871; Note (1935) 14 Tex. L. Rev. 71; (1935)
2o Iowa L. Rev. 853.
"Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32
Harv. L. Rev. 871.
1940]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Peek case seems fair. The defendants who voluntarily come into the
state to do business, accepting the protection and the benefits which
the state has to offer, should be made amenable to reasonable regula-
tions concerning the conduct of that business. Manifestly, such service
will be allowed only for causes of action arising out of the conduct of
the Texas business.52 Moreover service must be upon an agent of the
absent defendants. 53 It may then be assumed that notice thereof will
be communicated to the defendants.
54
Secondly, it is thought that there could be no constitutional ob-
jection to this extension of jurisdictional power. Fundamentally, the
law as regards in personam jurisdiction remains unaffected by the prin-
ciples which have been developed during the evolution of the Hess
case. Processes from the tribunals of one state cannot run into another
state and compel parties domiciled there to respond to proceedings
against them.5 5 However, processes of the state may reach non-residents
when they have expressly or by implication of law appointed an agent
upon whom process may be served.5 6
The solution of the constitutional objection, therefore, depends
upon whether Texas could impute to the defendants consent to the
substituted service on the basis of the defendants' voluntary act of
52Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 0935);
Davidson v. Doherty g: Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 7oo (1932), 91 A. L. R. 13o8
<1934) ; Thornburg v. Bennett, 2o6 Iowa 1187, 221 N. W. 840 (1928).
1'Thornburg v. Bennett, 2o6 Iowa 1187; 221 N. W. 840 (1928) first established
this dicta (supra note 33] which was subsequently adopted by the other cases which
arose under the Iowa statute.
14State of Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1256
(1933), 89 A. L. R. 653 (1934). The Court held that in order to preclude a denial of
due process, statutes which provide for substituted service must incorporate reason-
able provisions for giving the non-resident individuals notice of the initiation of
litigation. The court in the Peek case was of the opinion that where service was
made on defendants' agent, it was reasonable to suppose that he would communicate
this fact to his principal.
55Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 21 L. ed. 959 (U. S. 1873) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
14Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. 1091 (1927); Wuchter v.
PizzUtti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230 (1928) ; Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws (1934) §§ 84, 85. The Restatement takes the position that a
state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who has done an act within the
state, for a cause of action arising out of that act, when by the law of the state, by
doing the act, he has thereby subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the state for
that cause of action. It then qualifies this position by saying that the state cannot
validly provide that by doing certain acts the individual subjects himself to the juris-
diction of the state, when to do so would violate some provision of the Constitution.
It is thought that this type of argument contributes nothing to the solution of the
problem presented by the Peek Case.
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